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Abstract 
After describing the closely related concepts of judicial independence and independent 
judicial review of policy, the essay offers an overview of four issues. (1)Reasons for establishing 
an independent judiciary, including its ability to resolve problems of information asymmetry 
between citizens – principals and public officials – agents, transform constitutional 
declarations to credible commitments and provide a mechanism of political insurance. (2) 
Mechanisms for appointing judges and the jurisdiction of courts. (3) Modelling the role of the 
judiciary as an additional veto player in games of collective decision making and policy 
implementation. (4) The judiciary an explanatory variable and its effect on economic variables 
of interest like economic growth and the size of government. 
 
1 Definition 
Judicial independence means that courts enforce the law and resolve disputes without regard 
to the power and preferences of the parties appearing before them (La Porta et al, 2004). Its 
theoretical antecedents are traced to the Enlightenment and its application in practice dates 
to the US Constitution. Judicial independence is an indispensable part of the rule of law. The 
rule of law requires that laws apply equally to both ordinary citizens and public officials, and 
that they protect the rights of individuals against the power of the state in both the political 
and economic spheres. In this respect the rule of law and judicial independence are 
inextricably linked with liberal democracy. The literature on the topic is enormous and cuts 
across different disciplines including law, economics, politics and sociology. It is not possible 
to do justice to this scholarship in the confines of the present essay; rather its aim is to present 
a summary of the main issues. First, it considers the rationale of judicial independence and the 
closely related judicial review. Second, it looks at the institutional arrangements for judicial 
independence. Third, it considers how independent courts are modelled in the collective 
choice framework. Fourth, it discusses some evidence on the effects of judicial independence 
on economic variables of interest. These issues are analytically treated as separate but are best 
understood in relation to each other.  
2 Rationale for judicial independence 
A Judicial independence and related concepts 
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An independent judicial authority is necessary to resolve disputes and maintain the rule of law 
which are prerequisites for the functioning of a market economy and a free society. In general, 
two parties in dispute may resolve their differences by fighting violently against each other or 
by asking a third party to arbitrate. Realizing that fighting may result in serious inefficiency 
(destruction of life and property), they may ask a third party to adjudicate and agree to abide 
by its ruling. They will only do so, however, if they are reasonably confident that the 
adjudicating party is a neutral and unbiased referee. Disputes may emerge between private 
entities (citizens, companies or other organizations); between private entities and the state 
which among other cases is always a litigant in cases of economic regulation and criminal acts; 
and between different state organizations (central government, local authorities, nationalized 
industries, and other public law bodies). Judges with the power to issue binding rulings must 
then be shielded from the threat of corruption and intimidation by both private litigants and 
the arms of the state. 
However, the very act of referring a dispute to a mediator generates a new conflict: When the 
dispute resolver declares a winner and a loser, his legitimacy may be undermined leading to 
the collapse of the adjudication process and its benefits. The reason is that a ruling which 
obliges parties to behave in a particular way (take specific actions, pay damages, fines, 
sentence to prison) creates a two–against–one situation (winner and judge against the loser), 
which is resented by the loser. In order to overcome such problems arbitrators base their 
rulings on generally accepted principles of justice and conduct as expressed in formal laws and 
informal norms, and adopt rhetoric of normative justification. The two–against–one problem 
is even more pronounced in cases where the state is one of the disputants. A delicate 
balancing act then must be performed between the need to resolve disputes, protecting the 
independence of the judge and ensuring that he is perceived as serving only notions of justice. 
Closely related to judicial independence, is the function of judicial review of policy, where 
courts may examine and subsequently ratify or annul laws and policy measures, passed by the 
legislature and enacted by the executive branch of government, for their compatibility with 
the constitution or other relevant statutes (like declarations of basic rights), and have been 
enacted according to the stipulated procedures (Stone Sweet 2002). Similarly to ruling in 
disputes between private parties, judicial review of policy is meaningless unless the reviewing 
judge is independent of the government. Two further related concepts are those of judicial 
activism and judicial discretion. Judicial activism is the propensity of courts to query the 
decisions of elected officials and range from “nullifying acts of the legislature, to abandoning 
neutral principles, to deciding cases in a politically ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ fashion” (Hanssen 
2000 p. 538). Judicial discretion is understood as the degree to which the judiciary can 
implement rulings without being overruled by one of the other branches of government (Voigt 
2008).  
The interdisciplinary literature analyzing judicial independence can be divided into two 
strands. The first includes scholarship that treats a politically independent judiciary as an 
endogenous variable and examines the reasons for its establishment and the characteristics 
and degree of its political independence. The second strand considers courts as an explanatory 
variable and seeks to understand how it affects other political and economic variables of 
interest, mainly but not exclusively economic growth.  
B Reasons for judicial delegation  
A number of in truth complementary explanations of an independent judiciary and its review 
powers have been proposed in the literature. For a review complementary to the issues taken 
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up in the present section, the interested reader is referred to Harnay (2005). In all cases the 
starting point is the constitution. Constitutions, written or unwritten and other fundamental 
charters specify the rules by which collective decisions are made and the constraints set upon 
the government and the citizens. They contain declarations of general principles, procedures, 
organisational forms and rights and obligations, which in the absence of complete information 
and perfect foresight about future changes in tastes and technology, are rendered as 
incomplete contracts riddled with problems of interpretation and enforcement. The judiciary 
is the arm that interprets and enforces the constitution, all ordinary laws and policy measures, 
and for this reason judicial independence and judicial review are often analyzed jointly.  
Modern scholarship uses the insights of the economic analysis of institutions and game theory 
to examine the benefits of delegation to courts, see Law (2009) and Tiede (2006). Delegation 
of decision making by uninformed principals, like the citizens or their political 
representatives, to the judiciary, a specialised agent, offers several benefits. (a) It resolves 
problems of information asymmetry as courts develop the relevant expertise in resolving 
disputes and interpreting and enforcing the law, which subsequently allows specialisation of 
labour and increases welfare. (b)By taking resolution of constitutional disputes away from 
partisan politics and handing it to “politically disinterested” judges, judicial independence 
promotes the long-run interests of citizens. Politicians are better informed than ordinary 
citizens and exercise discretionary actions which opens up the opportunity for abuse of power 
to pursue their own interests at the expense of the rest of the society. Citizens may be 
protected from such abuses by subjecting politicians to elections, which allows voters to 
confirm or reject politicians, and by setting up checks and balances, where decision making is 
divided between different arms of government and each arm can block the actions of the rest. 
An independent judiciary is part of the latter mechanism. As it does not need to pander to 
short term shifts in public opinion it may be trusted to look after the long–run interests of 
citizens and control politicians. Thus, judicial independence is a mechanism that transforms 
constitutional declarations to credible commitments. Specifically, citizens wish to protect 
certain individual rights when the cost suffered by someone who is denied that right is very 
large relative to the gain obtained by others when the right is denied, and when those who 
grant the right, are uncertain whether they will be protected or harmed by that right (Mueller 
1991). For example, pronouncements of individual freedoms, property rights, protection of 
minorities, non–discriminatory taxation and the like can be trusted by the citizens, who safe 
in this knowledge will develop a longer time horizons increasing investment, growth and 
welfare (Maskin and Tirole 2004). Note that in the credibility rationale of judicial delegation 
the independent judiciary protects the interests of citizens against a mighty government, and 
political competition and judicial review are substitutes. This is based on an underlying 
conflict between on the one hand politicians (who irrespective of partisan ideologies pursue 
their personal interests against those of the citizens) and on the other hand all the citizens.  
(c) Contrary to the credibility view, the political insurance view of an independent judiciary 
considers the conflict between political groups competing for office and focuses on 
independent courts as a mechanism of political insurance. This approach builds on the famous 
thesis of Landes and Posner (1975) that a judiciary independent of the current legislature adds 
permanence to the distributive gains secured by the original winning political coalition. In 
essence the argument runs as follows (Stephenson (2003), Hansen 2004a and 2004b; and 
Tridimas 2004 and 2010). Constitutional judicial review implies that courts may prevent the 
election winner to implement his favoured policy measures if found to violate the 
constitutional arrangements and the rights of citizens. However, in exchange for this 
constraint, when the same party is out of office its opponent may also be prevented from 
implementing his favoured policy. Hence, the losers of the political contest can use the review 
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process as a mechanism to minimize the losses inflicted to them from the measures taken by 
the electoral winner. When political groups anticipate that they will not win every election 
and therefore they will be out of power, constitutional judicial review is a useful mechanism to 
restrain those in control of the government. Constitutional review by an independent judiciary 
lowers the risks associated with the uncertain outcomes of collective choice. On the above 
reasoning, one expects judicial review to be more pronounced in polities where political 
competition is strong and parties alternate in office. In the political insurance framework 
given the probability to win an election and the differences in the preferences of competing 
political groups, each political group is better off when an agent decides policy, but prefers to 
delegate policy making to an “ally”, that is an agent which has preferences similar to its own.  
See Cooter and Ginsburg (1996) and Hayo and Voigt (2007) for an empirical investigation of 
the determinants of judicial independence see. 
Note that delegating thorny issues to the judiciary may offer short run benefits to politicians 
who this way shift blame for unpopular decisions to independent agents to escape electoral 
punishment (Fiorina 1986). However, such delegation to the courts decreases the ability to 
claim credit for policies with a favourable impact. When the expected gains from shifting the 
blame exceed the expected losses from forgoing credit, the politician will choose to refer 
policy making to the judiciary. Shifting of responsibility is easier if the judiciary is perceived by 
the electorate as independent of the other branches of government. However, the latter view 
loses its explanatory power when voters cannot be fooled and recognise the politicians’ play. 
2 Institutional arrangements for judicial independence 
Judicial review of the acts of government is the most politicised aspect of the behaviour of 
courts. Judicial involvement in the political process and collective choice raises a fundamental 
question:  decision making by an independent but unelected judiciary may go against deep-
seated notions of majority decision making and electoral accountability. As soon as 
discretionary powers are granted to the judiciary a new principal – agent problem arises: A 
judiciary which is strong enough to block the legislative majority is also strong enough to 
pronounce rulings to pursue its preferences. What guarantees are there that the independent 
judiciary will not pursue its own interests at the expense of the citizens that it is supposed to 
protect? This is the well-known problem of "who will guard the guards?" going back to the 
ancient Greek philosopher Plato and the Roman poet Juvenal. Note the reverse dilemma too: 
accountability of the judiciary to give reasons and explain their actions is hardly controversial. 
But accountability by holding judges responsible for their decisions may infringe their 
independence. For it cannot be precluded that measures which aim to strengthen the 
accountability of an agent may be abused and weaken its independence. The solution of this 
dilemma depends on the arrangements that in practice balance the demands for judicial 
independence and accountability of the judiciary; see also Cappelletti (1983) and Shapiro 
(2002) for the tension between democracy and judicial independence. We divide the 
arrangements for judicial independence under two broad categories, structure and 
jurisdiction.  
A Structure  
The political independence of judges increases with the following. (a) The smaller the 
involvement of the government in the process of their appointment and the larger the 
legislative majorities needed for their confirmation; independence is even higher when judges 
are nominated by the judiciary itself. (b) The longer their term of service; independence is also 
higher when judges serve for a single term only or do not seek reappointment. (c) The greater 
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their financial autonomy which implies that salaries and budgets cannot be reduced by 
discretionary acts of the executive. (d) Transparency, the obligation to explain and justify 
rulings, enhances the independence of judges as it increases publicly available information, 
influences future courses of action, obliges non-elected judges to fully justify their decisions 
and discourages politicians or other interested parties to intervene in judicial outcomes. 
However, there is no consensus regarding the optimal degree of transparency. For example, 
although full disclosure has a certain intuitive appeal, keeping secret the voting record of 
judges may also have some advantages in the specific circumstances of supranational judicial 
bodies like the European Court of the EU. The Court does not disclose how individual judges 
have voted and, contrary to the USA Supreme Court, dissenting opinions are not published. 
This secrecy protects judges against possible retribution from governments which lost their 
cases at the Court. (e) The more difficult is to discipline and dismiss judges. (f) The more 
difficult it is for the government to overturn judicial rulings it does not like. Rulings can be 
overturned by introducing new legislation or changing the status and power of courts. The 
latter is less likely when courts are bound to follow legal precedent and when their 
independence is declared in the constitution which, contrary to ordinary legislation, requires 
super-majorities to revise.  
B Jurisdiction  
A range of issues are examined here – see Ginsburg (2002) for a detailed discussion of the 
structure and organisation of the judiciary.  (a) Whether ordinary courts can exercise judicial 
review of laws, as in the decentralised US system, or only specialized constitutional courts 
have such rights, as in the centralized system of the European countries following the model 
of the Austrian legal theorist H. Kelsen. (b) Whether judicial review is concrete, or abstract. 
Under concrete the constitutionality of a law is checked in a case which is actually litigated in 
front of a court, while under abstract a law may be examined without litigation. Related to this 
issue is whether review is carried out before or after the promulgation of a law. USA courts 
practice concrete ex post review, while the French Constitutional Court offers an example of 
abstract a priori review. Abstract and a priori review is not based on a real case but on a 
hypothetical conflict and is conducted with less information about “facts” and as such is more 
limited, but has the advantage that it can eliminate unconstitutional legislation before it 
actually does any harm. (c) In general, the power of the judiciary as an independent arm rises 
when individuals are granted more open access to the courts, and ceteris paribus when courts 
are allowed to review more legislation, since under these circumstances the hold of the 
executive on policy making is weaker. Note however that easy access may encourage trivial 
applications for annulments frustrating the exercise of the will of the majority but also 
increasing the judicial workload and therefore the cost of the system. (d) The ability of court 
rulings to “make law”. Although judiciaries do not make laws in the sense that legislatures do, 
insofar as they interpret legislation their rulings become a source of law and bind future 
rulings, their independence is greater than otherwise. Similarly, by annulling those acts and 
measures that they find incompatible with the constitution and fundamental charters, courts 
have a form of negative law making power.  
3 Modelling the behaviour of an independent judiciary  
The behaviour of the judiciary in collective decision making is studied by applying spatial 
decision models and game theory to the process of policy making. The judiciary is modelled as 
a rational agent pursuing an objective function defined over one or more policy variables and 
is pitted against the executive arm and the legislature in a sequential game; see Ferejohn and 
Weingast (1992), Hanssen (2000) Vanberg (2001), Rogers (2001), Tsebelis (2002) and 
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Stephenson (2004). Introducing the judiciary in the collective choice game typically adds the 
highest court as a veto player, which affects the set of feasible alternatives against the status-
quo. In this policy game the executive and legislative branches are not only interested in the 
outcomes of their own decisions, but also on whether their decisions will trigger the judiciary 
to move and reverse such decisions. 
The literature makes two key assumptions about the preferences of the judges. First, their 
preferences are based on ‘deeply internalised’notions of justice, the rule of law, and respect for 
legal reasoning. Second, judges would like to see their rulings implemented. However, in 
modelling the utility function of judges, normative objectives are not specified. To a large 
extent this comes from the generality of the rule of law that eludes more specific normative 
specification. Application of the rule of law does not necessarily imply that a “good” law is 
applied. The law may privilege the interests of whomever the lawmakers wish to favour. As 
Shapiro (2002) put it “The rule of law requires that the state’s preferences be achieved by 
general rules rather than by discretionary-arbitrary-treatment of individuals” (p.166). For 
example, courts of the apartheid era in South Africa were upholding the law of the land, but to 
the black population they could hardly appear as neutral and independent arbiters between 
the interests of different races.  
4 Empirical studies of the economic effects of judicial independence  
Application of the rule of law promotes a just society, protects individual rights and defends 
citizens against predatory governments, advancing in turn economic goals. Major research 
breakthroughs were made with the construction of indicators of the independence and the 
power of the judiciary as represented by supreme courts. Empirical research has found that 
countries with higher degrees of judicial independence enjoy higher economic performance 
(Henisz, 2000), greater economic and political freedom (La Porta et al. 2004) and a lower 
share of taxes (Tridimas, 2005). Most interestingly, Feld and Voigt (2003) distinguish between 
de jure independence, as described in legal texts setting up the supreme court of a country, 
and de facto independence which is independence of the supreme court of a country as it is 
actually implemented in practice, and find that only de facto judicial independence is 
conducive to growth.  
Regarding the effect of the method of selecting judges, appointment or election, on judicial 
outcomes, the literature notes a selection effect (the ideological preferences of judges who are 
elected may differ from the preferences of judges who are appointed) and an incentive effect 
(judges seeking re-election are more sensitive to the preferences of the electorate). It is found 
that appointed judges are more independent than elected ones, since elected judges are more 
sensitive to electoral considerations and may attach greater weight to the interests of litigants 
from groups who are presumed to have large electoral power; see Hanssen (1999). 
Informative as these findings may be, several open questions remain. In the first instance, 
there is the perennial problem of reverse causality, that is, richer countries can afford good 
judicial institutions rather than good judicial institutions leading to higher income. Second, 
the judiciary is approximated by the highest constitutional court and the latter is treated as a 
single decision taker. This ignores that in reality the judiciary comprises a hierarchy of lower 
and higher courts. In addition, even though the constitutional court itself is a collective body 
comprising several justices, subject to the well-known problems of reaching a collective 
decision, these problems are assumed away and the court is treated as a single decision taker. 
Finally, from the viewpoint of policy advice, the creation of legal institutions conducive to 
economic success requires long gestation periods, which may be of little comfort to a 
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government facing pressing short-run demands for growth-promoting policies. Significantly, 
the results from reforming the courts of developing economies to be politically independent 
and introducing statutes incorporating principles and procedures of codes found in advanced 
western countries have been underwhelming (Carothers 2006). It appears that the same deep–
lying factors of institutional failure were left intact and prevented the legal reforms to function 
as intended.  
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